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Abstract. Anonymity and verifiability are crucial security requirements
for voting. Still, they seem to be contradictory, and confusion exists
about their precise meanings and compatibility. In this paper, we re-
solve the confusion by showing that both can be expressed in terms
of (un)linkability: while anonymity requires unlinkability of voter and
vote, verifiability requires linkability of voters and election result. We
first provide a conceptual model which captures anonymity as well as
verifiability. Second, we express the semantics of (un)linkability in terms
of (in)distinguishability. Third, we provide an adversary model that de-
scribes which capabilities the attacker has for establishing links. These
components form a comprehensive model for describing and analyzing
voting system security. In a case study we use our model to analyze the
security of the voting scheme Preˆt a` Voter. Our work contributes to a
deeper understanding of anonymity and verifiability and their correlation
in voting.
Keywords: anonymity, verifiability, unlinkability, e-voting, adversary
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1 Introduction
Correctness of the election procedure and freedom to vote are fundamental re-
quirements for elections. If the voters cannot be assured that the election pro-
cedure has been followed correctly, they have no reason to trust the result, and
hence no incentive to vote. Similarly, if the voters cannot be guaranteed freedom
to vote, that is, if they cannot be assured that their votes cannot be interfered
with, and that their votes shall not give rise to repercussions, they have no rea-
son to express their true intentions. Absence of either assurance thus results in
an empty, meaningless exercise instead of a democratic process. Therefore, pro-
visions have been developed to provide these assurances. Correctness is assured
by means of verifiability: a voter can verify that her vote affects the election
result as she intended, and that the result is comprised only of votes cast by
eligible voters, all handled correctly. Freedom is assured by means of anonymity:
the system ensures that the voter’s preference is not revealed to anyone. Thus,
verifiability ensures a voter can link her vote to the result, while anonymity
ensures no one can link a voter to her preference.
Yet, there is an apparent contradiction between the verifiability and ano-
nymity, since verifiability seems to require traceability of the votes through the
system, whereas anonymity is at odds with precisely this concept. Confusion is
added because, in literature, there are opposing results. For example, [7] proves
incompatibility of these notions, while other works such as [6, 13], do combine
notions of verifiability and anonymity.
To understand how such seemingly contradictory results can hold, a thor-
ough understanding of both anonymity and verifiability in voting is necessary.
We alleviate the confusion by showing that both these fundamental security
properties can be expressed as properties of (the set of) links between objects
and entities in voting systems, although these links are different for verifiabil-
ity and anonymity. To this end, this paper introduces a comprehensive security
model for voting. It consists of:
1. an (un)linkability model (introduced in Sect. 3),
2. semantics in terms of (in)distinguishability (Sect. 4), and
3. components for constructing adversary models (Sect. 5).
The first two components provide a deeper understanding of anonymity and
verifiability and their correlation in electronic voting, and thereby improve pos-
sibilities for reasoning on the security of voting systems. The third component
allows to determine reasonable adversary models for individual election scenar-
ios. All three components together can be used to evaluate the security of voting
schemes by considering the (un)linkability provided in light of the adversary ca-
pabilities assumed, which we have done for the voting scheme Preˆt a` Voter. This
case study is provided in Sect. 6.
2 Background and Motivation
This section discusses the background on verifiability and anonymity in voting,
in order to define precisely the concepts that we wish to study.
In voting, verifiability has traditionally been split into two notions:
Individual Verifiability. The voter can verify that her vote affects the
result correctly.
Universal Verifiability. Anyone can verify that the announced result is
the correct accumulation of the individual votes.
Together, they assure that the result includes all votes correctly. The literature is
divided as to whether universal verifiability comprises verifying eligibility, i.e. the
fact that only eligible voters cast a vote (cf. [1, 7]). In [20] eligibility verifiability
was addressed first as a separate voting requirement.
Distinguishing between individual and universal verifiability has shortcom-
ings, as pointed out by [5]. This work gave rise to the domain of end-to-end
verifiability, which distinguishes the following types of verifiability (cf. [1, 18]):
Cast-as-intended. The voter can verify that her ballot correctly represents
her preference.
Counted-as-cast. The voter can verify that her vote counts “as cast”, that
is, in favor of the candidate that she voted for. This is sometimes split into
the following notions:
Recorded-as-cast. The voter can verify that her vote is stored by the
system as she cast it.
Counted-as-recorded. Anyone can verify that the announced result is
a correct amalgamation of the set of recorded votes.
The combination of cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast is named ballot casting
assurance in [1]. These notions enable a voter to follow her vote from input to
the final result. However, they have been interpreted in different ways to date:
counted-as-cast has, for example, also been said to allow anyone to verify that
the final tally is an accurate count of the ballots cast [16], or to allow any voter
to verify that all votes are counted as cast [3].
As remarked, anonymity has always been seen as essential to voting. Using tech-
niques such as anonymous channels, blind signatures, and homomorphic tallying,
classical voting systems such as [10] ensure that no one can learn how a voter
voted. However, over the years the notion of anonymity has been further refined
into the following forms:
Privacy. Privacy ensures that no observer learns how a voter voted.
Receipt-freeness. Introduced by [2], receipt-freeness ensures that the voter
is forced to keep her vote private, even if she would like to share it. It makes
sure that the voter cannot prove how she voted after the elections, thus
preventing vote buying.
Coercion-resistance. Introduced by [15], coercion-resistance ensures receipt-
freeness and resistance to the following attacks:
– Randomization: the voter is forced to vote for a random candidate.
– Simulation: the voter is forced to give her voting credentials to the ad-
versary, who then votes in her stead.
– Forced abstention: the voter is forced not to vote.
Note that this definition of receipt-freeness does not necessarily imply the above
definition of privacy, unlike others in literature (e.g. [8]). Moreover, according
to [8, 17], coercion-resistance implies receipt-freeness, while [4] claims that it is
possible to have a voting scheme which is coercion-resistant and yet not receipt-
free. These contradictory assertions show that the concept of anonymity requires
clarification as well. In the following, we use “anonymity” as a general concept,
while “privacy”, “receipt-freeness” and “coercion-resistance” are specific instan-
tiations of this concept in voting.
Anonymity and verifiability seem at odds with each other. In [7], Chevallier et
al. prove that unconditional privacy and universal verifiability cannot be simul-
taneously achieved without additional assumptions (such as private channels).
Most schemes in literature make such assumptions, and under these may be
able to achieve both verifiability and anonymity. However, the precise relation
between the two concepts within a single system is not yet thoroughly under-
stood.
To determine if a claim of anonymity or verifiability is valid, the voting
scheme is considered in the presence of an adversary. Various abilities may be
attributed to the adversary, depending on his anticipated strength. Examples of
such abilities are breaking cryptography and full control over communications.
The adversary models used to evaluate electronic voting schemes are usually
tailored to the specific scenario given by the respective voting protocol (see for
example [15]). A general adversary model which would allow to evaluate several
voting schemes (and, thus, to compare them with each other) has not yet been
provided. One approach would be to take the adversary model proposed by Dolev
and Yao [9]. However, as we will see in Sect. 5, this model has certain drawbacks
and, depending on the specific use case, can either be too strong or even too
weak.
3 (Un)Linkability Model
Section 2 has shown that anonymity and verifiability and their correlation in
voting are not fully understood yet. In this section, we present the first part of
our solution in terms of an (un)linkability model for voting which captures both
properties.
Terminology and notation. Any election can be described as follows: each voter
prefers a certain candidate1 and expresses this preference via her vote. The
vote is input to the voting system via the ballot, which represents the vote and
conceals it at the same time. Note that this description applies to both paper
ballot systems and e-voting systems. While the paper ballot usually is an enve-
lope containing the vote, the electronic ballot conceals the vote for example by
means of cryptography. Entities involved in the process include real-life persons
(voters v ∈ V , candidates c ∈ C) and objects (votes/options o ∈ O, ballots b ∈ B)
belonging to the voting system.
From this general description, we observe that any election can be modelled
by a set of links. These include the links voter–vote, vote–ballot, and ballot–
candidate. This enables us to express properties in terms of linkability. The
links between persons and objects are captured as follows:
– β:V → B links a voter v to her ballot b.
– τ :B → O links a ballot b to the vote o contained therein.
– pi:O → C links a vote o to the selected candidate c.
– ω:V → O links a voter v to her vote o (note that ω = τ ◦ β).
– γ:V → C links a voter v to her preferred candidate2 c (note that γ = pi ◦ω =
pi ◦ τ ◦ β).
1 Spoiling one’s vote can be modelled by voting for an empty candidate.
2 The modelling can be extended to encompass Single Transferable Votes (STVs) by
having each of the possible orderings of candidates constitute one option that the
voter can vote for (i.e., a “candidate” in the system).
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Fig. 1. Individual-related model
3.1 Anonymity as Unlinkability
Since anonymity concerns individuals, we consider an individual-related model
(see Fig. 1). This model considers individual entities and mappings between
them as introduced above: voter v casts a ballot b = β(v) containing the vote
o = τ(b) which refers to candidate c = pi(o).
Anonymity requires unlinkability of voter v and candidate c = γ(v), i.e. this
link must remain secret. We assume that there is no direct link in the system
between the voter and her preferred candidate since such a link would not be
under the control of the voting system (imagine, for example, each voter stand-
ing next to the candidate she prefers). Thus, in practice we always have the
decomposition γ = pi ◦ τ ◦ β. The function pi:O → C is assumed to be public.
Thus, anonymity can be broken down to unlinkability of voter v and vote ω(v)
(depicted by a dashed line in Fig. 1), which due to ω = τ ◦ β can be established
in two ways: unlinkability of voter v and ballot β(v), or unlinkability of ballot b
and vote τ(b). For example, blind signatures and mix-nets can be used to con-
ceal the link between voter and ballot, while unlinkability of ballot and vote is
provided in homomorphic schemes where an individual ballot is never decrypted.
In conclusion, anonymity can be expressed as unlinkability of individual voters,
ballots and votes.
3.2 Verifiability as Linkability
As (universal) verifiability concerns groups of individuals and sets of votes/ballots,
we extend our individual-related model to a set-related model, see Fig. 2. The
set of all received ballots B(V) is given by
B(V) = {b ∈ B | ∃v ∈ V :β(v) = b} ,
where we assume that all ballots are unique (otherwise, ballot duplication (e.g. by
replay attacks) would be easy). Similarly, Ω(V) denotes the set of all votes that
have been cast. In order to express this for homomorphic tallying as well, where
individual votes are never decrypted, we define Ω(V) as a multiset of all cast
votes (where each cast vote originates from a ballot), i.e.
Ω(V) = {(o, n) ∈ O × N | ∃b ∈ B: τ(b) = o ∧ n = (#b ∈ B: τ(b) = o)} .
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Fig. 2. Set-related model, relating all voters to all ballots, all votes and the final result.
This can be publicly transformed into the election result (e.g. the number of
seats for each party). Using the definition of B(V) and τ ◦ β = ω, we also have
Ω(V) = {(o, n) ∈ O × N | ∃v ∈ V :ω(v) = o ∧ n = (#v ∈ V :ω(v) = o)} .
Remark that we do not assume uniqueness of the votes: votes for the same can-
didate will usually3 have the same form. The election result, e.g. the number of
seats held by different parties in parliament, is obtained by a public transforma-
tion Π of the set of all votes Ω(V).
First we consider individual verifiability, requiring that each voter can verify
that her ballot correctly captures her intended vote and has been included in
the set of ballots to be counted. This is established by the following links:
1. the voter v can identify her ballot β(v) (cast-by-me)
2. the ballot b contains the correct vote τ(b) (contains-correct-vote)
3. the ballot b is contained in the set of received ballots B(V) (recorded-as-cast)
Following the concepts cast-as-intended, counted-as-cast and similar (see Sect. 2),
we have named the first two links cast-by-me and contains-correct-vote, respec-
tively. Both together correspond to the concept of cast-as-intended. Our third
link matches the established notion of recorded-as-cast. Note that our definition
of individual verifiability matches the concept of ballot casting assurance (see
Sect. 2). By the link between the vote o and the set of all votes Ω(V), the voter
knows that her vote is included in the tally. Still, the voter cannot pinpoint her
vote as we assume that the votes are not unique.
Universal verifiability, on the other hand, requires the public to be able to
verify that all received ballots have been counted correctly. This is established
by the link between the set of received ballots B(V) and the set of cast votes
Ω(V), which matches the concept of counted-as-recorded. Eligibility verifiability,
requiring anyone to be able to verify that only eligible voters cast a vote [20],
is expressed by the link between the set of received ballots β(V) and the set of
voters V . Public verifiability, thus, comprises linkability of all voters with the
set of received ballots (eligibility verifiability) and linkability of received ballots
and counted votes (universal verifiability or counted-as-recorded). Verifiability
can thus be expressed as linkability of sets of voters, ballots and votes.
3 This is not necessarily the case, e.g. in ThreeBallot [18] or in single transferable
voting (STV).
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Fig. 3. (Un)linkability model
3.3 Unified (Un)Linkability Model
The individual-related and the set-related model are merged as shown in Fig. 3.
This unified model captures verifiability (desired linkability) as well as an-
onymity (desired unlinkability) as follows. Since the link between the result
and the set of all votes is public, verifiability is expressed by linkability of the
set of all voters and the result (depicted with a “
√
” in Fig. 3). With respect
to anonymity, we require unlinkability of a voter and her preferred candidate
(depicted with an “X” in Fig. 3). The distinction between unlinkability of voters
and candidates in the individual-related model and linkability of all voters with
the election result in the set-related perspective is the key strength of our model.
It explains how anonymity and verifiability can be combined in voting systems.
Although there is an obvious trade-off between anonymity and verifiability, in
our (un)linkability model, both are expressed by the same link in the individual-
related and the set-related scenario, respectively, which shows the close relation
between anonymity and verifiability.
The above model intuitively captures both anonymity and verifiability in
terms of (un)linkability. It enables defining the notions cast-as-intended, counted-
as-cast, recorded-as-cast and counted-as-recorded unambiguously. We also intro-
duced the notions cast-by-me and contains-correct-vote to specify the term cast-
as-intended, which has been interpreted in different ways to date. We now move
on to the semantics of linkability and unlinkability.
4 Semantics of (Un)Linkability in Terms of
(In)distinguishability
What does it mean that certain events in the voting system are (un)linkable?
We argue that distinguishability is the natural concept to provide a semantics
for the unlinkability properties. To explain this, we need the notions of a voting
protocol, which specifies which types of messages should be exchanged by the
various involved parties, and a protocol run, which is the instantiation of the
protocol in a particular election. For reasons of clarity, we denote runs informally
as sequences of messages [m1,m2,m3]. Distinguishability then amounts to the
observer’s ability to spot differences between two runs. In particular, these often
are the actual run of the election and a hypothetical, slightly altered one. A
formal definition of (in)distinguishability can be found in [11].
Intuitively, a voter should be able to distinguish between a run where her
vote is counted correctly and a run where her vote is counted incorrectly (cast
a, count a versus cast a, count b). This is a verifiability property. However, an
attacker should not be able to distinguish between a run where the voter votes a
and a run where the voter votes b (cast a, count a versus cast b, count b). This
is an anonymity property. In the following, we give more precise descriptions for
these properties. A piece of information e1 from a protocol run is linkable to a
piece of information e2 for agent A if A can distinguish between a run containing
e1 and e2, and a run containing e1 and e
′
2. For example, consider the linkability
of a voter v and her vote ω(v). The linkability of the voter to the vote states
that a run [. . . , v, . . . , ω(v), . . .] is distinguishable from a run where the vote is
modified [. . . , v, . . . , ω′(v), . . .]. From the perspective of the voter, it means that
only this vote can be hers. Vice versa, the linkability of the vote to the voter
states that a run [. . . , v, . . . , ω(v), . . .] is distinguishable from a run where the
vote was cast by another voter [. . . , v′, . . . , ω(v), . . .]. From the perspective of the
voter, it means that this vote can only be hers.
These distinguishability properties establish verifiability from the voter’s per-
spective. Depending on the requirements of a particular system, the distinguish-
ability should either hold only from the perspective of the voter, or from the
perspective of anyone. For reasons of anonymity, we certainly do not want any-
one to be able to distinguish the situations where a voter casts different votes.
This leads to a desirable form of unlinkability. However, we cannot account for
situations where a particular candidate does not receive any votes from others, as
this would make directly observable whether the voter votes for this candidate.
Therefore, it should be indistinguishable to the attacker whether two voters swap
votes, i.e. the attacker cannot distinguish between a run where voter v1 votes
ω(v1) and voter v2 votes ω(v2), and a run where voter v1 votes ω(v2) and voter
v2 votes ω(v1) (cf. [8]).
Similar definitions can be derived for the set-related perspective. Using this
semantics, it becomes possible to relate linkability to the observation capabilities
of the attacker. In the next section, we will discuss such capabilities. Any formal
protocol semantics can be used to formalize these distinguishability properties
and reason about them, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Components for Setting-specific Adversary Models
As mentioned in Sect. 2, voting systems are considered in the presence of an ad-
versary with specific capabilities. Thus, in order to apply our (un)linkability
model and its semantics to existing voting protocols, we need an adversary
model. However, a set adversary model (such as the Dolev-Yao model [9]) can
be too strong or too weak for a specific situation.
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Fig. 4. Adversary communication model
For example, in an employees council election the CEO may have an interest
to influence the results, but is not allowed inside the election office. Similarly, in a
national election it may be of interest to determine the impact of a single person
with limited power, not an adversary who can control all communications. On
the other hand, cryptographic schemes may turn out to be broken, and messages
encrypted with such schemes may (eventually) be decrypted without using the
decryption key (a particular risk for e-voting, as often, sensitive data is published
to provide verifiability). None of these scenarios are adequately captured by the
Dolev-Yao model, nor can they all be captured by any one adversary model.
Instead of adhering to one adversary model, we decompose the adversary’s
capabilities into specific components. With these components, one can easily
define a fine-tuned adversary model for specific use cases.
Setting. A generic e-voting system (see Fig. 4) consists of voters and several elec-
tion authorities (EAs). The voters are registered by the EAs and subsequently
cast ballots which are processed by (possibly different) EAs. A public broad-
cast channel (bulletin board, BB) is used by the voters and the EAs in order
to post messages for reasons of verifiability. Additionally, there are communica-
tion channels between each voter and the EAs, which may be cryptographically
secured (e.g. by encryption, signing, blinding, etc.). We assume that the EAs
communicate via the BB.
Adversary Capabilities. In addition to communication abilities (based on the
communication model above, and inspired by the capabilities of a Dolev-Yao
intruder), we consider cryptographic abilities. Furthermore, we distinguish be-
tween the adversary’s abilities concerning existing communication channels, and
his ability to create new communication channels (represented by dashed lines
in Fig. 4). Thus, the capabilities of an adversary can be divied as follows:
I. capabilities concerning existing communication channels,
II. capability wrt. new communication channels,
III. cryptographic capabilities.
I. Capabilities Concerning Existing Communication Channels. We dis-
tinguish the following adversary capabilities regarding the ways in which the
adversary can affect existing communication channels:
Ia. The adversary can detect channel usage.
Ib. The adversary can determine the sender of a message.
Ic. The adversary can eavesdrop on communication channels.
Id. The adversary can block communication channels.
Ie. The adversary can inject messages into communication channels.
If. The adversary can modify messages sent over communication channels.
An untappable channel provides perfect anonymity [15] and thus protects against
an adversary with any of the above capabilities. An anonymous channel protects
against an adversary with capability Ib. When analyzing voting schemes in light
of the adversary capabilities, Ib and Ia-f shall not be considered for channels
which are assumed to be anonymous or untappable, respectively.
II. Capabilities Concerning New Communication Channels. For the
second category, we consider the following adversary capabilities:
IIa. The voter can send messages to the adversary.
IIb. An EA can send messages to the adversary.
IIc. The adversary can send messages to a voter.
IId. The adversary can send messages to an EA.
IIe. The adversary can post messages to the BB.
By repeated use of capabilities IIa-d, the adversary establishes one-way or two-
way communications with groups of voters and/or groups of EAs. Capabilities
IIa and IIb model voters or, respectively, EAs who cooperate with the adversary
by leaking secrets (e.g. receipts proving a voter’s vote), whereas IIc and IId
model an adversary who coerces EAs or voters (e.g. by furnishing the voter with
voting material in order to cast a specific vote), cf. [17].
III. Cryptographic Capabilities. For the third category, we do not assume
that cryptography works perfectly (as opposed to the Dolev-Yao model [9]):
IIIa. The adversary can break cryptography providing computational security.
A voting scheme using cryptographic algorithms which provide information-
theoretic security is secure even against an adversary with capability IIIa.
The attacker model determines which messages an attacker can observe
and/or alter, and thereby which distinguishability properties hold. As we have
seen in the previous section, these distinguishability properties determine in turn
which messages are linkable for the attacker. Combining these three ingredients,
real-life voting systems can be analysed in terms of (un)linkability, with respect
to the combination of anonymity and verifiability.
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Fig. 5. Marked ballot form in Preˆt a` Voter
6 Case Study: (Un)Linkability of Preˆt a` Voter
The properties expressed as (un)linkability, the semantics of (in)distinguishabi-
lity and the adversary model together form our comprehensive model of voting
security. In this section, we analyze (un)linkability of the state-of-the-art voting
scheme Preˆt a` Voter (PaV) [19].
PaV was originally developed by Ryan [19] and since then extended often. We
analyze the version of [6]. The participants are voters,an election authority EA1,
and k tellers EA2, . . . , EAk+1. Before the election, EA1 generates the paper
ballot forms consisting of two columns: the left column contains a candidate list
determined by a cyclic offset from the base candidate ordering; the right column
holds a random value at the bottom, the onion, which buries the information
necessary for reconstructing the candidate ordering (see Fig. 5). To cast a vote,
the voter registers at the polling station and randomly selects a ballot form.
In the booth she marks the right column and then tears off the left one and
shreds it. The right column is scanned and the image is send to the BB after the
end of the election. Each teller performs an anonymizing mix and decryption by
subsequently operating on the onions.
6.1 (Un)Linkability Analysis
First we consider verifiability. The correct processing of the ballots in the tallying
phase can be publicly verified by randomized partial checking [14]. This estab-
lishes (probabilistic) linkability of the set of received ballots and the set of all
votes (counted-as-recorded).4 PaV does not provide a means to verify eligibility.
The voter can visit the BB to check that her receipt is correctly posted
and hence correctly entered into the tallying process (recorded-as-cast). This
means that the voter can distinguish her ballot from a ballot cast by another
voter, which establishes linkability of ballot and voter (cast-by-me). However,
the voter does not obtain any proof that the onion matches the candidate order
in the left column and thus will be decrypted to the vote she intended to cast.
Hence, linkability of ballot and vote (contains-correct-vote) is not provided.
4 We refer to linkability of sets rather than individual ballots and votes, for which
unlinkability under randomized partial checking has been proven in [12].
PaV allows for pre-election auditing5 by revealing the construction of selected
ballot forms. Thus, anyone can compute the onion as well as the offset for the
candidate ordering and thereby verify that the ballot form was prepared cor-
rectly. This establishes a link between the ballot form and the set of candidates,
in particular: the ballot’s candidate ordering.
In PaV, the link between a voter and her ballot is ensured by the receipt;
the link from one ballot to the set of ballots by the ballot box; the link from
the set of ballots to the set of votes by the mixnet; the link from the vote to
candidates by decryption after mixing, which also serves to link the set of votes
to the result. Note that there is no link from cast ballots β(v) to votes ω(v) –
this link is hidden by the mixnet. The link from the received ballots B(V) to the
set of votes Ω(V) is probabilistic (as mentioned above). Finally, note the absence
of a link between the set of all voters V and the set of all ballots B(V), as PaV
does not provide eligibility verifiability.
Next, we consider the different adversary capabilities, thus showing how our
model can be used to analyze the security of PaV in terms of (un)linkability.
Capabilities Concerning Existing Communication Channels. Note that
cast ballots do not contain any personal information of the voter. Also, individual
ballots cannot be linked to the contained votes due to the mixing. If the adversary
is restricted to public information, PaV thus provides unlinkability of voter and
ballot and unlinkability of ballot and vote.
Consider an adversary attacking the communication channel from the voter
(scanner) to the BB. Capability Ia allows the adversary to determine that the
voter casts a ballot (but not what is on the ballot). Capability Ib enables the
adversary to determine which ballot the voter cast (and so determine the validity
of a vote). Using Ic, the adversary learns the link between the voter and her
ballot. He can distinguish a) between this voter casting the ballot and another
voter casting the ballot, and b) between the voter casting this ballot and the
voter casting another ballot. The link thus works in both directions. Id enables
the adversary to suppress ballots from being posted to the BB. This attack
is detected if the voter checks the BB for her vote. With capability Ie, the
adversary can post illegal ballots to the BB. An adversary with capability If is
able to modify ballots sent to the BB. As for Id, such attacks can be detected
by the voter.
Capabilities Concerning New Communication Channels. The ballots
that are input to the voting system do not contain any personal information of
the voter. However, if the voter forwards her receipt (IIa), the adversary can
distinguish between the voter casting this ballot and the voter casting another
5 While auditing concerns linkability, it concerns ballots that are not cast, as opposed
to verifiability (which concerns ballots that are cast). As the (un)linkability model
does not distinguish one ballot from another, it cannot make this distinction. For
completeness sake, we nevertheless address the linkability of audited ballots.
capability effects
Ia determine existence of link voter → ballot
Ib reveal link voter → ballot
Ic reveal link: voter → ballot and ballot → voter
Id ballot suppressed (detectable by voter)
Ie eligibility compromised
If ballot modified (detectable by voter)
IIa reveal link: voter → ballot
IIb reveal link: ballot → vote (for all ballots)
IIc reveal link: voter → vote (chain voting attack)
IId reveal link: ballot → vote (for all ballots)
IIe eligibility compromised
IIIa reveal link: ballot → vote (for all ballots)
Table 1. Security of Preˆt a` Voter in terms of (un)linkability
ballot, and, thus, can link this voter to her ballot. Using capability IIb, ballot
and vote can be linked: either EA1 reveals the association between the candidate
ordering and the onion, or each teller EA2, . . . , EAk+1 reveals his private key. An
adversary equipped with capability IIc can furnish the voter with a marked ballot
(obtained, for example, from EA1, IIb) before she enters the polling station and
coerce her to hand back an unmarked ballot form (IIa), thus proving that she
cast the ballot provided by the adversary and linking her to the according vote
(chain voting attack). If the adversary can send messages to an EA (IId) prior to
the election, he can furnish EA1 with the secret values for generating the ballot
forms. Thus, the adversary knows the link between each ballot and each vote.
Using IIe, the adversary can compromise eligibility by sending ballots to the BB
as for Ie.
Cryptographic Capabilities. If the adversary can break the preimage resis-
tance of the hash function (IIIa), he can trace back votes through the mix-net
(cf. [6]), thus establishing a link between ballot and vote. If the adversary can
break the encryption (IIIa), the ballot transformation is revealed and the adver-
sary learns the link between each ballot and the corresponding vote.
(Un)Linkability of Preˆt a` Voter. We have seen that, depending on the adver-
sary capabilities, different forms of (un)linkability are provided. The capabilities
of category I can be used to establish a link between voter and ballot in PaV,
thus anonymity is hurt in the presence of such an adversary. The capabilities
of category III can be used to link voter and vote, thus destroying anonymity.
For category II capabilities, both kinds of attacks are possible. Moreover, using
either IIb, IId or IIIa, anonymity in PaV is broken, as each of these enables
the adversary to uncover ithe link between ballot and vote for all ballots. The
security of PaV in terms of (un)linkability is summarized in Table 6.1.
PaV offers linkability of the set of received ballots and the set of all votes (uni-
versal verifiability), but linkability of ballot and vote (contains-correct-vote) is
provided only for uncast ballots. This approach assures the voter that her actual
vote will be correct without providing her with a receipt that could be used to
prove it. As this approach does not reveal this link, this approach is far better
suited for reconciling verifiability and anonymity than the traditional approach
of having the voter check the correct form of her cast ballot.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we resolved the confusion on the combination of verifiability and
anonymity in voting systems by providing a comprehensive and general model
of voting security. The model consists of:
1. an (un)linkability model capturing both anonymity and verifiability;
2. (informal) semantics of linkability in terms of distinguishability;
3. components for adversary models which describe the capabilities an attacker
has for distinguishing and determining links.
The value of the (un)linkability model lies in the unification of seemingly different
properties under a common terminology, enabling a clear visual representation of
desirable and undesirable properties (see Fig. 3). The adversary components en-
able analysing and designing voting systems for particular environments, where
the adversary capabilities deviate from regular assumptions.
Taken together, this model provides a unified approach to assess the secu-
rity of voting schemes: it can be used for analyzing the level of anonymity and
verifiability provided depending on the adversary capabilities assumed. This has
been demonstrated with the Preˆt a` Voter system in a case study. Thus, different
voting schemes can be compared in an intuitive, informal, yet precise way.
We recommend future work on formalizing the semantics, in order to enable
automatic verification of properties. Also, additional case studies can lead to
a visual representation of the differences between voting systems in terms of
linkability properties.
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